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Abstract  
Most histories of the National Socialist SA come to a close with the Night of the Long Knives in 
the summer of 1934. For the remaining eleven years of National Socialist rule, the stormtroopers 
are usually regarded as a peripheral ‘nostalgic drinking companionship’ of early Nazi activists 
that, apart from their involvement in the persecution of the Jews, did not wield much influence. 
In contrast to such views, this article argues that the SA remained an important mass 
organisation in the Third Reich that not only helped to stabilize the Nazi regime within the 
boundaries of the German heartlands but also contributed importantly to the German 
expansionist policies from 1935 onwards. My argument is developed in three stages: First, I 
assess the SA’s contribution to the German settlement movement in the 1930s that was originally 
concerned with the ‘inner colonialism’, the population transfer within the existing borders of the 
German Reich in order to stimulate agriculture and economy in disadvantaged German regions, 
in particular in the northern and eastern provinces. Second, I concentrate on the analysis of the 
plans and initiatives of the so-called ‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of 
new farmers and matters of ethnicity’ between 1938 and 1942. In a third and final part, I discuss 
these plans and the actual developments in the light of the expansionist Nazi policies of de- and 
reterritorialization during the war years, advanced in particular by the SS. Although the SA’s 
extensive pre-war ambitions in ‘Germanization’ suffered a serious backlash with the outbreak of 
the war, it still contributed in important ways to the formation of the Volksgemeinschaft in the 
occupied territories. 
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Introduction 
The historiography on the SA, the Nazi stormtroopers, so far concentrated on the years 1921-
1934 with the movement’s ‘years of struggle’ in the late Weimar Republic and the brownshirts’ 
violent contribution to the implementation of the Nazi dictatorship in 1933 and 1934.1 By 
contrast, historians have explored only few aspects of the SA’s history for the remaining eleven 
years of the Third Reich.2 This is all the more true with regard to the extensive and often 
excellent research literature on the German expansionist policies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
In these studies, Himmler and the SS take centre stage, whereas the SA is passed over in 
silence.3 In a way, historians of National Socialism thereby remain loyal to a narrative that many 
former stormtroopers after the Second World War shaped for their own de-Nazification purposes 
and that was also given credibility by the trial of the major war criminals before the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg in 1945/46. According to this narrative, the SA was 
without a doubt a leading Nazi organisation that had decisively contributed to the increase in 
political violence in the late Weimar Republic and had also exercised massive terror in the wake 
of the Nazi takeover of power in 1933 and 1934. By contrast, for the years that followed the 
stormtroopers are usually regarded as peripheral ‘old fighters’ who formed hardly more than a 
nostalgic drinking companionship.4 
 However, from the perspective of someone who aims at contributing to a comprehensive 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte of National Socialism,5 the SA is an important organisation worth 
studying also for the years of consolidated Nazi rule. Despite the executions of Ernst Röhm and a 
considerable number of high-ranking SA leaders in the ‘Night(s) of the Long Knives’ between 
30 June and 2 July 1934, to be followed by a wave of internal cleansing within the higher ranks 
of the stormtroopers, the SA remained an important National Socialist mass organisation with 
more than one million members in 1939. Under Röhm’s successor Viktor Lutze, who remained 
at the helm of the SA until his death in 1943, the organisation consolidated and by the late 1930s 
even grew in importance again, not least a consequence of the ever more expansionist German 
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foreign policy and the radicalisation of the regime’s antisemitic persecution. Whereas the 
relationship between the SA and the SS never recovered from the latter’s ‘stab in the back’ in 
July 1934, a situation that only became worse with Himmler’s SS taking control of the regular 
German police forces, the relationship with the Wehrmacht improved, culminating in the 
agreement from 19 January 1939 that attributed the SA sole responsibility in paramilitary affairs. 
The SA was to organise the regular pre- and post-military trainings that, according to the 
regime’s ambitions, were to play an integral part in German men’s lives. Among NSDAP 
functionaries, support for the SA likewise remained strong—not only out of nostalgia, but 
increasingly also as a means to hold the ambitious SS in check.6 
In what follows, I will argue that the SA not only helped to stabilize the Nazi regime 
within the boundaries of the Reich, but that it also contributed to the German expansionist 
policies from the mid-1930s onwards. During these years, a major goal of the regime was to 
create new Lebensraum, or ‘living space’, for Germanic people, by engaging in vast geopolitical 
expansionist policies of de- and reterritorialization, that is the violent removing or enslavement 
of Jews and Slavs in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe and the following ‘repopulation’ 
of this allegedly empty space with people of Germanic origin.7 A particular effort was made to 
win over Germans living abroad and to make these people, after the incorporation and 
annexation of borderland territories they partly inhabited, a genuine part of the nation. In this 
respect, a semantic shift is telling: Whereas Germans abroad until the early twentieth century 
were called Auslandsdeutsche, literally ‘Germans living in foreign countries’, the Nazis during 
the 1930s turned them into Volksdeutsche, or ‘ethnic Germans’.8 The SA felt called to actively 
engage in this process, not least because it seemed an opportunity to regain lost power within the 
patchwork of competing National Socialist organisations. From the second half of the 1930s 
onwards, the stormtroopers put forward their own ideas for the ‘Germanization’ of the European 
east—first with the aim to stimulate the settlement of SA men from the Old Reich into the newly 
occupied and annexed territories, above all in the Warthegau and in the General Government, 
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and then by the establishing of new SA units there that were to consist predominantly of those 
‘ethnic Germans’ who had previously settled beyond the borders of the Reich. 
 The following article is based on the available secondary literature as well as on printed 
primary and unpublished archival sources, in particular the extensive collection of SA files in the 
German Federal Archives. It is divided into four parts. Against the background of the recent 
historiographical debate about the nature and scope of the German Volksgemeinschaft, or 
‘people’s community’, I begin with outlining the fields of activities for SA stormtroopers and 
assess their importance for consolidating and upholding Nazi rule after 1934.9 One political 
domain in which the SA was determined to play an important role was the National Socialist 
settlement movement. I will evaluate the SA’s contribution to this movement in the 1930s that 
was originally concerned with the construction of new villages and city districts for the Party 
faithful. Such activities were part of ‘inner colonialism’, the population transfer within the 
existing borders of the German Reich in order to stimulate agriculture and economy in 
disadvantaged German regions, in particular in the northern and eastern provinces.10 
The second part concentrates on the radicalised plans and initiatives of the so-called 
Beauftragter des Stabschefs [der SA] für Neubauernsiedlung und Volkstumsfragen, literally the 
‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of new farmers and matters of 
ethnicity’. Preliminary results as well as the SA’s ultimate failure will be critically assessed in 
the third section. In a fourth and final part, I will discuss my findings against the background of 
the current state of research on the German settlement policies shortly before and during World 
War II. I will argue that, although its initial ambitions in ‘Germanization’ policies ultimately 
failed—due to the rise of Himmler’s SS and the shortage of qualified SA men who were in very 
high numbers drafted into the Wehrmacht beginning in the fall of 1939—the SA still contributed 
in important ways to the ideological as well as pragmatic formation of the Volksgemeinschaft in 
the annexed territories.  
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The SA and early settlement initiatives in the Third Reich 
It was no coincidence that the SA’s interest in the German settlement movement intensified in 
the middle of the 1930s, shortly after the ‘Röhm purge’. In its attempts to open up new fields of 
action that would keep the SA men busy and could help its leadership corps to claim important 
positions in the consolidated Third Reich, the SA started to get involved in the settlement 
movement. As early as June 1933, the Nazi government had declared a national priority with the 
‘Law on the New Formation of German Peasantry’.11 Already some years before, by the late 
1920s, the NSDAP and its auxiliary organisations—most prominently the SA—had started to 
systematically reach out to the people in rural Germany. Against the background of the ‘agrarian 
crisis’ of the 1920s that aggravated inner-migration to the big cities, the NSDAP in many parts of 
Germany successfully exploited the high level of discontent among the rural population, 
presenting itself as the political party determined to preserve the habits, values and historical 
merits of the German provinces that were even glorified as the ‘blood spring of the German 
people’ [Blutquelle des deutschen Volkes].12 
 Initially, the involvement of the SA in the settlement movement was limited to attempts 
at population transfer within the German Reich. For example, it encouraged rank-and-file 
stormtroopers from Lower Saxony to move as so-called ‘West-East settlers’ to more thinly 
populated areas in Mecklenburg and Pomerania.13 In 1937, at least one larger SA settlement 
project was set forth in every territory of a particular SA group—which is roughly comparable to 
the size of the actual German Länder, the federal states. Financed by the so-called Dankopfer der 
Nation, an annual national collection organised by the SA on the occasion of Hitler’s birthday on 
20 April, such SA settlements were designed to help deserving SA men, disabled ex-servicemen 
and particularly large families to be able to live on their ‘own soil’.14 The Supreme SA 
Command (OSAF) supported such settlements of SA men with 225,000 Reichsmark in total. 
Widely varying in size, these settlements were located in Osterholz near Bremen, in the 
Pfalzdorf swamp next to the East Frisian city of Aurich and in nearby Petkum, in the north of 
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Braunschweig, in Wittstock/Neumark, in the Bavarian city of Rosenheim, in Jena in Thuringia 
and in the Upper-Silesian Eichenkamp near Gleiwitz (today’s Gliwice).15 The later settlement, 
soon re-baptised ‘SA-Dankopfersiedlung Glaubenstatt’, meaning ‘Place of Faith’, became the 
SA’s model settlement, build not least to ‘create a völkisch dam’ in order to fight back the 
‘Polish appetite for expansionism’, at least symbolically. Although the outbreak of war 
prevented the original plans from being fully realised, most buildings of this settlement, which 
was to provide a home for up to 2000 people, could be completed.  
Glaubenstatt had two centres: the stadium with a tower that was to serve as a youth 
hostel, and a market square that was surrounded by an assembly hall, a school building and a 
home for the HJ. Yet, there was also a shooting range and an air-raid shelter. A track and field 
arena for paramilitary sports was planned, but probably never completed.16 The conception of the 
Glaubenstatt complex exemplarily demonstrates that the SA’s Germanization policies have to be 
seen in the context of its pre-military training of German males, to be carried out in close 
cooperation with the Wehrmacht and the Hitler Youth. This paramilitary education comprised 
both practical exercises with physical training and shooting lessons, but also ‘political education’ 
[politische Erziehungsarbeit].17 It did not only target men in the Old Reich, whom the Nazi 
propaganda continuously exposed to the idea that racially homogenous settlements had to be 
regarded as ‘prerequisite for the fulfilment of the regime’s economical, domestic and racial 
objectives’,18 but would later also reach out to ethnic Germans organised in the SA in the 
occupied territories.19 
Regional plans from 1937 aimed at the construction of not more than 2,500 settler’s 
holdings nationwide, predominantly carried out as single-family homes.20 Every house should 
consist of three or four rooms, covering at least sixty square meters, to be complemented by a 
large garden of 1000-1500 square meters at the inhabitant’s disposal and intended mainly for the 
cultivation of vegetables and the breeding of small domestic animals. Unlike ‘Glaubensstatt’, 
which was built on former woodland, most of these modest settlements were so-called 
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Stadtrandsiedlungen or ‘suburban settlements’, located in immediate vicinity to existing 
developments. Their parcels of land were much too small to allow for self-dependent 
agriculture.21 Within these settlements, however, and contrary to the omnipresent ramblings of 
‘building a people’s community’, the authorities deliberately fostered social inequalities, for 
example by granting different sizes of land. The rationale of this unequal treatment was to 
intensify the competition among the new settlers, and to honour political and economic 
leadership.22 According to a regulation from 1934, only male candidates who were either married 
or at least engaged were to be considered for such settlers’ colonies, provided that they possessed 
the ‘necessary good hereditary factors’. When the authorities realised that the comparatively 
small size of the houses did not correspond with the regime’s propaganda for sexual 
reproduction, it slightly increased the housing space in these settlements so that families with 
many children could also be accommodated.23  
Overall, the authorities imagined the Nazi society in these settlements as competitive, 
racially pure and devoted to the Nazi project. The NSDAP heralded its settlement projects as 
proof of the fact that the party kept its social promises dating back to the years of the Great 
Depression. In reality, however, the number of 2,500 SA settlers’ holdings was minimal, 
compared to the overall 22,000 settlements put in place between 1933 and 1939 and even more 
so to the 57,457 settlements that were created during the years of the Weimar Republic (1919-
1933), among them 7,500 east of the river Elbe.24 As early as 1931, the German Reich had 
started an ambitious small-settlement programme that attempted to provide new homes for 
workers on the outskirts of the larger towns. As politicians, social reformers and wealthy 
industrialists alike hoped, these settlements would provide the German worker with a renewed 
sense for the ‘soil’ [Scholle] and prepare at least some of them for farm work in the years to 
come.25 The Nazis built on such earlier plans and initiatives, while at the same time claiming 
sole authorship for them.26 
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Despite the limited extent of the Nazis’ ‘inner colonisation’ attempts, they quickly turned 
into a ‘preliminary stage’ for much more ambitious colonisation projects abroad.27 In contrast to 
the social realities, in particular the widening gap between the income of farmers and industrial 
workers in the Third Reich that did not help the popularity of agricultural labour,28 the official 
discourse on settlements was soaked in blood and soil: the SA, together with the 
Reichsnährstand, the statutory corporation of farmers in the Third Reich, was allegedly 
predestined to stop the rural flight and to preserve the peasantry. Because of their willingness, 
their ideological training and their combat strength, the SA men were allegedly ideally suited to 
serve as ‘innovators of the German peasantry’. Already early in the Third Reich, the regime 
regarded the population transfer of loyal party activists as one tool to achieve a politically 
coherent national community. Even if this population transfer was initially limited to Germans in 
the Old Reich and only put in practise on a modest scale, it demonstrated that the ideology of 
creating and re-organising existing Lebensraum long before the beginning of World War II 
informed the course of Nazi politics. What Nazi propagandists usually did not openly address 
was that that German agriculture suffered from a severe lack of workforce in the late 1930s. The 
often low-qualified SA men were therefore talked into farming jobs also for purely practical 
reasons.29 Instead, high ranking Nazi officials like the Reichsminister of Food and Agriculture 
Richard Walther Darré in a guest article for the magazine Der SA-Führer in 1938 emphasized 
that peasantry and (political) soldiers were to join hands in order to victoriously fight the 
‘Germanic-Teutonic people’s struggle for survival.’30 
Such statements did not only constitute a remarkable departure from the common image 
of the SA man as urban street fighter, still omnipresent in the Nazi propaganda during these 
years. Whereas the quintessential stormtrooper of the Kampfzeit had been an aggressive and 
determined young man and ‘comrade’,31 disciplined at the party’s command but more than 
willing to react with his fists at all provocations when let lose, the SA peasant was presented as a 
man in his prime, still physically strong, but in the first place a responsible family man and as 
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such a defender of the German race. The former hotheads of the urban jungle had matured into 
hardworking and self-reliant individuals, exemplary German men who valued and cultivated the 
German soil, held firm to the regime’s values and ideas, and were at the same time actively 
involved in fighting what the Nazis perceived as white-collar effeminacy. This new rhetoric also 
build a bridge to the idea that fascinated at least parts of the Supreme SA High Command from 
1936: reintroducing the SA back into the political game by promoting the settlement of 
individual SA men as farmers and agricultural labourers in the European East, perceived as 
Lebensraum, or ‘space to live’ for battle-tested National Socialists.  
Historical research so far has stressed that the inner colonisation movement in Nazi 
Germany lost its importance with the establishment of the Wehrmacht in 1935. Not farmers, but 
soldiers were now called to protect the German borders.32 However, I will demonstrate that these 
early NS settlement plans and projects remained politically important throughout the second half 
of the 1930s: as a preliminary stage for the soon-to-be captured Lebensraum. A closer look at the 
plans of the ‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for the placement of new farmers’ and his 
successors between 1938 and 1943 will demonstrate that the SA expanded its spectrum of tasks 
by drafting settlement plans for the occupied and occupied territories beyond the actual borders 
of the Reich. 
 
Siegfried Kasche and the SA’s intensified settlement plans in the first years of  
World War II 
The man of central importance for the SA’s ‘Germanization’ plans during this period was SA-
Obergruppenführer Siegfried Kasche. 33 Born on 18 June 1903, he belonged to the so-called ‘war 
youth generation’, like so many committed Nazi activists. He was trained at the prestigious cadet 
school in Berlin-Lichterfelde during the First World War and subsequently—still a very young 
man—fought with Freikorps units in Berlin and in the Baltic area. In the early 1920s, Kasche 
joined a ‘joint work service’ [Arbeitsgemeinschaftsdienst] in Pomerania and later also worked in 
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the banking sector, the glass industry and the textile trade. He became a member of the NSDAP 
in 1926 and made a stellar career in the SA. In 1928, at the age of only twenty-five, he was 
already appointed to the position of deputy Gauleiter of the Ostmark, based in Frankfurt/Oder. 
Two years later he sat in the Reichstag. Kasche survived the Night of the Long Knives and was 
promoted to SA-Gruppenführer in Lower Saxony on 9 November 1936. One year later, SA-
Stabschef [Chief of Staff] Lutze, appointed him leader of the SA group Hansa, headquartered in 
Hamburg. Finally, Kasche became the first German envoy in Agram/Zagreb, Croatia, on 17 
April 1941.34 
 According to his own account, Kasche had started talks with Darré about the possible 
deployment of stormtroopers as farmers as early as 1936. Two years later, in September 1938, 
Lutze officially appointed Kasche to the position of ‘commissioner of the SA Chief of Staff for 
the placement of new farmers and matters of ethnicity’ [Beauftragter des Stabschefs [der SA] für 
Neubauernsiedlung und Volkstumsfragen]. Kasche thereby followed in the steps of SA-
Gruppenführer Georg Mappes, who as ‘SA Reich treasurer’ [SA-Reichskassenverwalter] had 
been previously responsible for settlement affairs in the SA.35 The new commissioner took his 
new task very seriously, as several lengthy and detailed guidelines and reports by him make 
clear. The first of these important documents was the ‘Guidelines for the SA’s participation at 
the new formation of the German peasantry’ from 8 September 1938. They stated that the 
potential farmers for the new settlements in the Third Reich, to be located above all in Silesia, 
Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, had to be chosen not only by their qualification alone, but also 
by their ‘hereditary value’ [blutsmäßigem Wert]. It is important to emphasize, however, that 
these guidelines were still intended to apply exclusively to settlements within the existing 
borders of the Reich. The SA should furnish up to thirty per cent of all new peasant settlers in 
order to guarantee the ‘political-ideological firmness’ within the new rural communities.  
Kasche requested the then sixteen SA groups in the Reich to maintain close contacts with 
the ‘settlement agencies’ [Siedlungsunternehmen] operating in their respective regions and to 
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name potential settlers from within the ranks. The groups were asked to keep lists in special ‘red 
books’ of all those interested in the settlement projects.36 However, only those SA men could be 
considered who possessed the Neubauernschein, a certificate handed out by Darré’s 
Reichsnährstand intended to attest the potential settler’s (and his family’s) racial, mental and 
physiological qualities. Only men who were at least twenty-five years of age, married and of 
‘Aryan descent’ were permitted to apply.37 Next to these criteria to be verified by the 
Reichsnährstand, the SA-Standarten in charge were also requested to provide a judgement on the 
applicant’s political and personal suitability. It was to be based on his service in the SA, his 
personal and professional circumstances, but also his physical fitness, his character, intellectual 
capacities and accomplishments. In the end, an overall mark had to be attributed, ranging from 
grade one (very well suited for placement) to four (little qualified).38 Surviving lists from the 
year 1941 show that a very good mark was very rarely given. Most often the applicants were 
ranked in category two (well suited) or three (suited). For the acquisition of a new farm, Kasche 
estimated that every new settler from the SA would need about 9,000 Reichsmarks—with up to 
5,000 Reichsmarks financed by subventions from the Dankopfer der Nation.39 
Such plans stood in the tradition of the modern Prussian respectively German borderland 
settlements established at the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century. Such 
settlements were planned as German bulwarks against the Slavic neighbouring peoples who 
allegedly were at a lower cultural stage, or so many German borderland ideologues claimed.40 
Shortly before the German attack on Poland, SA-Oberführer Udo von Alvensleben, who dealt 
with settlement questions for the SA Supreme Command on Kasche’s behalf, claimed that since 
the time of the military conquests of the Teutonic Knights in the Middle Ages, a ‘peasantry on 
guard’ [wehrhaftes Bauerntum] had always been the guarantor to secure the German influence in 
Eastern Europe. He concluded: ‘What we have won by the sword needs to be defended and 
secured by the plough’.41 Such arguments were by no means an invention of the National 
Socialists. As historian Christoph Dieckmann has convincingly demonstrated, expansionist 
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German plans developed during the First World War already urged for the expulsion of the 
Polish, Russian and Jewish populations in Lithuania and demanded the establishment of German 
Wehrbauern, peasants who would serve as a human defensive bulwark, throughout the Baltic 
states.42 For German experts in spatial planning, parts of Eastern Europe during World War One 
served as a field for experimentation in which they could apply their increasingly radical 
settlement plans and colonial phantasies. Just two decades later, National Socialist politicians 
and experts happily built on such exploratory work.43 
 However, the SA settlement plans from 1938 also contained a disciplinary part that was 
supposed to have an internal effect. The high proportion of SA men within these new German 
settlements was aimed at ensuring political homogeneity, or more precisely, at guaranteeing 
the preeminence of the NSDAP and its ideology within these new settlements. The active 
recruitment for the SA settlement programme for the border regions of the Reich began by a 
number of talks Kasche and his assistants held in front of SA leaders in March 1939. These 
activities culminated in a four-day long working session in Berlin and Frankfurt/Oder with a 
field trip to the Upper-Silesian village of Schlochau in early May 1939. In addition to 
representatives of the SA High Command, participants included the regional representatives for 
‘peasantry settlements’ [Neubauernsiedlung] of every SA group.44  
 
Intensified SA settlement initiatives in the early stages of World War II 
SA settlement initiatives enjoyed a new lease of life with the Wehrmacht’s military victory over 
Poland in the autumn of 1939, even if the recruitment of potential settlers suffered from the fact 
that many of the previous SA recruiters were now drafted into the military. Despite such 
practical difficulties, Kasche regarded the war as a most-welcome opportunity to expand the SA 
settlement plans eastwards. As early as 8 November 1938, he informed his boss Lutze and the 
leaders of the SA groups in a confidential letter that the placing of new SA farmers had gained 
greater importance because of the newly acquired territories. In defiance of Heinrich Himmler 
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being appointed ‘Reich commissioner for the strengthening of Germandom’ on 7 October 
1939,45 Kasche insisted that an ‘extensive involvement’ on the part of the SA was by no means 
excluded and in fact highly desirable. Therefore, he urged his fellow-SA leaders to register even 
more potential farmers from the ranks of the SA with the aim of placing them in these new 
territories, despite ‘all possible inhibitions and ties to their homelands’.46 A circular from 8 
December 1939 specified the next steps, indicating that the new SA settlements would initially 
be concentrated in those areas of Upper Silesia that were now integrated into the German Gau 
Silesia. Unlike the Warthegau and Danzig district, for that no detailed planning with regard to 
rural settlements existed yet, farmland in Silesia was released for ‘immediate settlements’, in 
cooperation with the governor of Silesia and the Schlesische Landgesellschaft based in Breslau. 
Previously Polish owned farms, usually of the size of twenty acres, were to be expropriated. 
Several of these small Polish estates should then be merged to create between 3,000 and 4,000 
bigger farms with at least eigthy acres, the circular stated. If these figures were correct, this 
means that the number of farms in the previously Polish parts of Upper Silesia that the Germans 
expropriated after their military victory amounted to approximately 15,000. In contrast to the 
year 1938, the SA leadership now informed potential settlers that personal capital resources were 
no longer needed for the move eastwards: ‘The farms will be handed over with inventory’.47 
However, a two-year-long probationary period during that the new German peasant had to 
demonstrate that he was in fact able to run such a farm should precede the final transfer of 
ownership.48 As the majority of stormtroopers were meanwhile drafted into the Wehrmacht, the 
SA leadership repeatedly stressed that its men under arms would, in no way, suffer 
disadvantages because of their inability to obtain a placement immediately. The entire settlement 
area in Poland would be large enough to host all aspirants, during and also after the war.49 
Despite such assurances, isolated farmers from the ranks of the SA started to contact the 
Reichsnährstand directly to be considered as administrators on former Polish estates with the 
beginning of the war. That the SA was bypassed in these cases frustrated Kasche. He warned his 
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fellow stormtroopers that such incidents were exploited by the enemies of the SA as a proof of 
its organisational weakness.50 Nevertheless, such problems continued. Two years later, in 1941, 
Kasche claimed to have contacted the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in order to care for the 
approximately 700 SA men working for it. In the previous two years, the OSFA had no direct 
influence on these stormtroopers.51 Despite these shortcomings, the surviving archival 
documents demonstrate that the SA persistently tried to secure a decisive influence in settlement 
matters, not the least in order to create a reliable powerbase for the SA’s future growth. This was 
all the more important as the build-up of regular SA units in the newly occupied territories 
beginning in the autumn of 1939 took place in a chaotic way (if it happened at all). These new 
units were initially neither to be incorporated into the Reich SA, nor did the OSAF supply the 
SA groups bordering these new regions, in other words Ostmark, Ostland, Silesia and Sudeten, 
with additional financial means in order to expand their areas of operation.52 
 In practical terms, the SA intended to be fully operational with at least 5,000 new SA 
settlers ready to move east immediately at the end of the war. In the meantime, the candidates 
were to be selected according to political and racial criteria in a joint effort of the SA with 
Darré’s Reichsnährstand. They were to be educated in three specially designed SA settlement 
schools [Siedlerschulen], located on SA estates that were to be established within the 
‘incorporated Eastern territories’.53 In 1941, Kasche claimed that he had met with Himmler and 
his representatives several times to discuss the necessary transfer of ownership of suitable 
estates. He also asserted that he had held talks with the office of the ‘General Authority for 
Public Land Management within the Incorporated Eastern Territories’ [Generalverwalter für die 
öffentliche Landbewirtschaftung in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten], based in Litzmannstadt 
(Łódź).54 The provisional outcome of his talks, Kasche noted, consisted of the agreement that the 
SA was promised to receive the estate Krośniewice on lease for an initial fifteen-year period by 
the end of the war. Gauleiter Arthur Greiser had decided this accordingly in the summer of 1940 
or even earlier, but he had also informed the SA that the final transfer of property into the hands 
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of the NSDAP could only happen after the war, allegedly for legal reasons [sic!].55 Located near 
the city of Kutno in the Reichsgau Wartheland, some 100 kilometres west of Warsaw, 
Krośniewice was previously owned by a Polish noble family. In addition, the SA was to become 
the proprietor of Błonie castle, built on this estate.56 In the new SA training schools to be 
established, the SA was to offer two-week courses for potential new settlers and for SA leaders 
in the new German territories that aimed at ‘preparing them for their particular ethnic tasks’ 
[volkspolitische Aufgaben]: ‘To fight foreign and inferior influences [in the new German eastern 
territories, D.S.], we have to inculcate every fellow German with the awareness of his hereditary 
value [stolzes Blutbewußtsein]. … Even the individual man needs to know that this is not his 
private affair, but a matter that concerns vital question of his peoples’ survival. The SA is 
requested to attach absolute importance to the observation of such issues’, Kasche urged, 
conceiving the SA farmers in the new settlements not only as exemplary cultivators of land, but 
also as a kind of vice squad.57 
 Despite his repeated claims that the new peasants from the ranks of the SA had to 
contribute to the historical challenge in ‘making the regained territories German again for all 
time’,58 the actual figures of potential settlers willing to leave the German heartland for newly 
acquired territory in the European east were most disappointing. Instead of the (internally) 
estimated number of 50,000 potential settlers from the rank and file of the SA who disposed of 
the practical experience necessary for farming, only a fraction of the estimate, mere 1,045 men, 
had signed up by the test day 20 June 1940.59 Admittedly, the number of registered aspirants 
doubled to 2,150 until 30 April 1941, but this figure still remained far below the expectations of 
the SA leadership.60 Kasche, however, attributed this low number exclusively to practical, war-
related problems. In 1941 he claimed that the SA would easily manage to furnish the 45,000 men 
then needed—and this without drawing on the ethnic German repatriates who had been moving 
to Reich territory in great numbers since the beginning of the war.61 This remark was a direct 
critique of Himmler, for whom Kasche had maintained a firm distaste ever since the Night of the 
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Long Knives and therefore well before the Reichsführer SS gained control over most of the 
settlement and migration processes in German occupied Eastern Europe. Himmler likewise held 
similar thoughts about his rival. The relationship of the two men remained poisoned even after 
Kasche had been appointed to the position of German envoy to Croatia and had left the field of 
‘applied’ SA settlement policies.62 
 A closer examination of the geographical distribution of potential SA settlers, as passed 
on in Kasche’s report and several monthly registers from the second half of 1941, indicates that 
the vast majority of those interested in such a transfer lived in the north and east of the German 
Reich, in borderland regions where the idea of a ‘defensive peasantry’ built on a certain tradition, 
going back to the nineteenth century and even further. The SA groups Pomerania and Silesia 
were the best recruiting SA groups with more than 300 aspirants each, followed by the SA group 
Nordmark (Schleswig-Holstein) with 240 candidates. At the bottom ranged the SA groups of 
Hesse, Bayrische Ostmark and Alpenland, having reported only twelve, seven and three men, 
respectively.63 When faced with these numbers, it is hard not to qualify Kasche’s assertive 
remarks as calculated optimism—an optimism that was out of touch with the realities of German 
society at war. However, one should also be careful to see the SA recruitment figures as a 
complete failure, as will be explained further down with reference to comparable figures of the 
SS.  
 Despite all practical problems as well as Kasche’s overemphasis of his own 
achievements, his reports demonstrate that the SA pursued her own ‘Germanization’ policies 
since the mid-1930s. The reports also underline that the SA Supreme Command intensified the 
planning with the outbreak of World War Two, despite Hitler’s appointment of Himmler as 
‘Reich Commissar for the strengthening of Germandom’ in October 1939. Hitler’s decree 
explicitly stated that the new Reich commissar would be responsible for the ‘configuration of 
new German settlement zones by relocation, in particular through the settlement of Germans and 
ethnic Germans returning home from abroad’.64 Theoretically, the competences within the 
  
 
18 
‘Germanization’ policies were thus neatly divided: while the SS was responsible for the 
settlement of Volksdeutsche returning home,65 the SA could claim that it was entitled to keep on 
taking care of the resettlement of German peasants originating from the Old Reich. As late as 
January 1941, Kasche insisted on this division of responsibilities between the SA and SS. He 
stated not only that stormtroopers would not be employed in settlements ‘where the SS is 
providing the National Socialist core,’ but also pointed out that ‘it needs to be emphasised that 
the safeguarding of the German east depends on the German peasant taking roots with the soil by 
the work of his own hands. A German master class [Herrenschicht—here Kasche critically 
alludes to the tradition of the influential Prussian Junkers] overseeing soil-rooted masses of 
foreign peoples would not accomplish the task’.66 Such a distinction elucidates how in the SA 
older ideals of Werkstolz – the pride in work from one’s own hands —were closely related to 
new geopolitical concepts of racial and cultural superiority. The new German master class was to 
be a class of nationally conscious (male) workers, Kasche postulated, and it would be 
characterized, as Ernst Jünger had written as early as 1932, by voluntary discipline, the contempt 
for pleasure, and a war-minded spirit.67 
In reality, however, Himmler—who in the context of plans for a creation of a Greater 
Germany since 1936 had taken a deep interest in questions of ethnicity and race—tuned into a 
direct rival of Kasche and Darré in settlements questions immediately with his appointment in 
1939.68 The powers were extremely unevenly distributed among them. By the late 1930s, 
Himmler as Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police Forces had become one of the most 
powerful men in the Third Reich. His strong position among Nazi leaders had further increased 
by the multitudinous crimes his SS had committed since the German attack on Poland in 
September 1939.69 Kasche, on the contrary, could only count on the substantially weaker SA and 
on a small number of supportive influential National Socialists like the Reich Minister Alfred 
Rosenberg and Martin Luther, the string-puller in the Foreign Office.70 Kasche certainly lacked 
the power to challenge Himmler when it came to the implementation of competing political 
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concepts. When Himmler advocated the creation of larger farms and country estates in the 
occupied east with the argument that these larger farms would be necessary for German families 
of particular racial value—a plan that was directly opposed to Kasche’s more egalitarian vision, 
as outlined above—the SA-Obergruppenführer could only insist that some of these new large 
landowners be recruited from within the ranks of the SA.71 This is just one example that 
demonstrates that between late 1939 and early 1941, Himmler successfully marginalised the SA 
in the field of practical ‘Germanization’ policies. Next to the internal problems of SA 
recruitment, this was another important reason why its settlement plans developed during World 
War Two concentrated more and more on the immediate post-war period. Questions of the 
allocation of powers in peacetime could thus be left undecided.72 
 
Max Luyken and the SA’s retreat from active settlement initiatives 
After Kasche had taken over the position of German envoy to the Independent State of Croatia 
(NDH) in April 1941, SA Chief of Staff Lutze did not appoint a formal successor for nearly a 
year, thereby indirectly admitting defeat in the trial of strength with Himmler. Finally, from 
February 1942 until February 1943, SA-Obergruppenführer Max Luyken served as ‘Chief of 
Staff for New Peasant Settlements and Matters of Ethnicity in the SA and the SA-
Wehrmannschaften’ [Inspekteur für Neubauerntum und Volkstumspflege in der SA und den SA-
Wehrmannschaften]. Unlike the young and energetic Kasche, Luyken who was eighteen years 
his senior and aged fifty-six in early 1942, was more of an SA bureaucrat who did not feel any 
need to confront Himmler.73 The SA over the year 1942 nevertheless continued to register 
potential SA farmers—with numbers rising from 1,196 to 2,555 between 1 April 1942 and 1 
January 1943. In the remaining archival documents there is no explanation given as to why 
Luyken started with slightly more than 1,000 enrollees on 1 April 1942, whereas Kasche had 
specified 2,150 as the overall number of applicants on 30 April 1941 (see above). It is likely that 
some of the original applicants had successfully been placed in the meantime, while an unclear 
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percentage had died on the battlefields between 1939 and 1942.74 Furthermore Luyken’s new 
numbers comprised all possible settlers, those who were interested in a transfer within the 
boundaries of the Old Reich and those who longed for the new ‘German East’. The total of the 
latter group was just 1304, or fifty-one per cent of all those registered on 1 January 1943.75  
These numbers, at least from the perspective of Luyken, reflected the intensified 
propaganda campaigns that the SA organised in close collaboration with the Reichsnährstand 
over the year 1942, intended to whet the Germans’ appetite for farming and rural life. Topics at 
information events included ‘SA settlers tell about their lives’, ‘SA comradeship in the 
settlements: help from the neighbours’, but also, adopting the vocabulary of the life reform 
movement and clearly reaching out to women as well: ‘The happiness of our children: breathing 
freely and growing up in close touch to nature’.76 One can thus assume that at that point, settlers 
from the ranks of the SA had actually made their way into east European farmhouses. However, 
in August of the same year, Lutze prohibited all future transfers of new farmers from the Old 
Reich into the ‘German east’. Only war veterans and ethnic Germans from abroad were still to be 
settled there for the rest of the war years.77 According to an internal statistic from January 1943, 
the SA had, by then, transferred a total number of only 422 registered applicants. However, it is 
not clear whether this number designated all stormtroopers deployed between 1939 and late 
1942, or just those resettled since Luyken had taken office. It is likewise unclear whether this 
number comprised also the inner-migration settlements or only those to the new German 
territories. But even with no reliable statistics at hand, it seems likely that the total of SA 
peasants settled in the east did not exceed a three-digit number, considering the few registered 
candidates. Finally, on 16 February 1943, two weeks after Germany’s defeat at the battle of 
Stalingrad, Lutze eliminated Luyken’s post of ‘Chief of Staff for New Peasant Settlements and 
Matters of Ethnicity in the SA and the SA-Wehrmannschaften’ without substitution.78 
 
Reluctant peasants and persistent ideologues 
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Despite all ideological and practical difficulties, the SA’s relevance for the Nazi settlement 
policies was not peripheral, mainly for two reasons: Firstly, even after Kasche had reported for 
duty as envoy in Croatia, he was still Hitler’s first choice for the new position of ‘Reich 
commissar for Moscovy’ in the summer and fall of 1941, a position to be created after the 
(allegedly imminent) German victory over the Soviet Union.79 Alfred Rosenberg as Reich 
Minster for the Occupied Eastern Territories requested an absolutely ‘ruthless personality’ for 
this job—and he recommended Kasche.80 In this capacity, Kasche’s main task would initially 
have been to sharply suppress all forms of possible Russian and Communist resistance. Provided 
that the Wehrmacht had successfully defeated and occupied the Soviet Union, it seems likely that 
Kasche as the SA’s expert in questions of settlements and ethnicity would have played an active 
and much more influential role in the practical ‘Germanization’ policies in Eastern Europe, and 
maybe even beyond.  
As late as June 1941, the Hamburg professor of education Gustaf Deuchler, a fanatical 
stormtrooper himself, produced at Kasche’s request a draft report on the ‘necessity and the tasks 
of an SA colonial storm (K-Sturm). According to Deuchler, such an SA ‘K-Sturm’ should bring 
together older Germans with colonial experience in Africa and a new generation of brownshirts 
who aspired to ‘go into the colonies’. The K-Sturm’s instructions would provide these younger 
men with the ‘spirit of German colonial policies’, a political attitude that according to Deuchler 
would be required for ‘proper judgement in colonial affairs’ and for at least ‘some basic skills in 
the treatment of the natives [Eingeborene]’.81 Deuchler’s draft never won any political 
significance, not least because of Kasche’s new position as German envoy in Croatia and the 
course of the war. Yet, even in 1944 Kasche held on to the view that the SA was well prepared to 
furnish the necessary ‘human material’ [Menschmaterial] for the required German settlements in 
the post-war period. He was convinced that the Third Reich’s social and political order, and in 
particular the SA as an organisation that could mobilize millions of men, would then serve as 
role model in post-war Europe as a whole. 
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Kasche was by no means the only SA leader who was considered for or appointed to 
prominent positions in the German occupied east. SA-Obergruppenführer [general] Karl-
Siegmund Litzmann was made General commissioner for Estonia in late 1941, and SA-
Obergruppenführer Heinrich Schoene, the longtime SA leader in Schleswig-Holstein, was 
appointed the General commissioner for Volhynia-Podolia. Furthermore, no less than five SA 
generals were sent as German envoys to south-eastern Europe between 1940 and 1941—next to 
Kasche these were Manfred von Killinger, Gottfried von Jagow, Hanns Elard Ludin and Adolf-
Heinz Beckerle. These appointments make it clear that the SA, despite suffering from the fact 
that most of its men were drafted into the military from 1940 onward, continued to provide Nazi 
top officials well into the middle of the Second World War. For this reason alone, the SA 
remained an organisation its competitors had to reckon on. In any case, Kasche, as designated 
Reich commissar for Moscovy, could rely on a web of like-minded fellow-SA generals in 
various positions in Eastern Europe. We know that the course of history took a different 
direction, but the network of SA leaders in the region seemed reasonably strong to help him 
implement at least some of his plans in the post-war period, provided that the war would be won. 
 The SA’s settlement plans and activities merit recognition, secondly, as a comparison 
with the later SS settlements policies reveal striking continuities. Although the extent of the 
required German settlements increased substantially with the Nazis’ territorial gains between 
1939 and 1942, the SS’s discourse on the transfer of Germans from the Old Reich closely 
resembled the previous statements of the SA. Furthermore, the SS suffered from the same 
problems: In its preliminary work on the Generalplan Ost in the spring of 1941, the Reichsführer 
SS’s Main Planning Office in Berlin noted that roughly 200,000 families would be needed for 
the formation of a German peasantry in the newly occupied and annexed territories in Eastern 
Europe.82 In order to accomplish the goal that thirty-five per cent of the whole population in 
these areas should work in agriculture, the planners calculated that in these new territories—so 
far inhabited by up to eighty per cent ethnic Poles—a total of 1,46 million agricultural workers 
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of German origin would be needed.83 The new farmers were expected to be ‘the origin and the 
foundation of the entire ethnic German builtup’ [Volksaufbau]. Unlike many farmers of the Old 
Reich, whom the SS characterised as politically conservative and narrow-minded, these new 
farmers were supposed to represent a new kind of peasantry, fully conscious of its national and 
racial task. The SS claimed that the German farmer in the newly conquered Eastern territories 
had to regard himself as a true political fighter ‘on the attack’.84 
 Such formulations hardly reflected the realities of the German occupation, initially 
characterised by largely uncoordinated settlement actions of ethnic Germans from Galicia, 
Volhynia, Bessarabia and the Baltic region.85 Germans who were living within the borders of the 
German Reich of 1937, however, did not show much enthusiasm for a permanent migration 
eastwards. Himmler acknowledged that by June 1942 the SS had only received 4,500 settler 
applications from the German heartlands. Two thirds of the applications had been submitted in 
the course of the previous year, after the German attack on the Soviet Union that summer.86 The 
attempt to increase the number of ‘Germanic’ Wehrbauern with the help of farmers from the 
Netherlands, who were targeted by German and Dutch propaganda since 1941 and whom 
Himmler praised as ‘racially incredibly valuable’ [blutsmäßig unerhört wertvoll], was likewise 
hardly a success. Many of the 5,000 settlers from the Netherlands who moved to the ‘German 
East’ between 1941 and 1944 only remained for a short while. A report from the Dutch 
Commissie tot Uitzending van Landbouwers naar Oost-Europa, literally the ‘commission for the 
secondment of farmers to eastern Europe’, in ‘February 1942 lamented the regularly very low 
level of education of the Dutch peasants in the east and contemptuously called them a ‘bunch of 
adventurers’ with very little professional knowledge and insufficient leadership skills.87 
 Such numbers and remarks put the aforementioned failure of the SA’s recruitment 
attempts within their own rank-and-file in perspective. It was apparently not only the SA’s 
inadequate organisation that was to blame for the relatively low numbers of applicants, but a 
much more deeply rooted problem: Despite the intense Nazi settlement propaganda prior to and 
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during World War Two, just very few Germans living in the Old Reich warmed up to the idea of 
leaving their home towns and villages for good in order to build a new existence as ‘defensive 
peasants’ in Eastern Europe – in areas that everyone with a grain of historical and political 
knowledge knew were fervently contested among different national groups and where excessive 
violence prevailed in the 1940s.88 In a certain way, one might say that the relative failure of 
earlier ‘inner colonialization’ attempts repeated itself on a larger scale. Theory and practice did 
not match. Undoubtedly, millions of German men and women as soldiers, policemen, officials, 
teachers, nurses and auxiliaries actively participated in the racially motivated conquering 
expedition of large parts of Eastern Europe. They looted, robbed and murdered.89 However, this 
did not imply that they were committed to implementing the National Socialist vision of a post-
war ‘German East’ with a will of their own and presumably far-reaching personal consequences. 
This holds true in particular for peasants, who were usually closely attached to their family’s 
soil. Whereas many of those who actually moved east were young and unmarried, thus relatively 
open for change and excitement, the SA men targeted in the National Socialist propaganda were 
middle-aged husbands and family fathers, a group whose members in many cases had already 
decided on where to live, with whom, and how to sustain a living. For these men, the economic 
risk of possible failure loomed large, especially as many lacked the necessary financial and 
social capital to recover quickly in the event of losing their income and home. 
This observation qualifies the assumption that the Nazi regime attempted to satisfy the 
expectations and demands of the German peasants by the acquisition of new ‘living space’ and 
new settlements there in the first place.90 If one takes the actual behaviour of the German 
peasantry as a benchmark, it is obvious that only a small minority of farmers were willing to 
support the National Socialist settlement plans by indicating their willingness to permanently 
move into these areas. The actual implementation of the far-reaching SS settlements plans that, 
in 1942, provided for the migration of up to 220,000 peasant families from the Old Reich would 
have required massive state force.91 Yet, World War I veterans like Hitler by all means wanted to 
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avoid protests at the ‘homefront’, their lasting trauma. The contemporary catchword of 
Ostrausch, meaning a ‘frenzy for the east’, thus described a phenomenon that in reality remained 
largely confined to a limited number of people, in particular planning experts and young and 
unmarried men and women who desired to make their own contribution to the ‘German mission’ 
in the east. German peasants from the Old Reich, by contrast, drawn from the tasks of the ‘battle 
of agricultural production’ [Erzeugungsschlacht], and furthermore suffering from the shortage of 
available labour in rural Germany, reacted far less enthusiastically. Against this backdrop the 
regular assurances of SA and SS leaders that ‘no German soldier fighting at the front’ would 
return too late to benefit from the new settlement projects had little significance in practice.92 
 
Conclusion: the SA und its contribution to the formation of a ‘people’s community’ in 
Eastern Europe 
Farming in the occupied east seemed attractive only for a minority of Germans. As a 
consequence, resettlement experts like SS brigade leader Herbert Backe soon had to 
acknowledge that the ‘new formation of German peasantry in occupied Europe’ should be seen 
as a long-term project that would probably come to a close no earlier than long after the war.93 
Nevertheless, the SA Germanization policies mean more than a somehow obscure footnote in the 
history of National Socialism expansionism, mainly for two reasons: 
Firstly, the SA’s plans constituted—spatially and temporally—the connecting link 
between the Reichsnährstand’s earlier ‘inner colonization’ projects and the later radical 
Germanization projects of the SS. They contributed to the ‘racial mobilisation’ (Michael Wildt)94 
in the Third Reich especially by inculcating the individual SA man with convictions of ‘racial 
consciousness’ [Blutsbewusstsein] and ‘bonds to the soil’ [Bodenverbundenheit] on the occasion 
of the German resettlement of the east in the late 1930s and early 1940s.95 Thereby, they merged 
the traditional discourse of the German ‘defensive settlements’ [Wehrsiedlungen] with the 
National Socialists’ new racial categories. 
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Secondly, the SA’s Germanization plans remained important with regard to the 
organisation’s later activities in the final years of the war. Despite the fact that the original plans 
were hardly put to a practical test and thus largely remained ‘utopian imaginations’, its inherent 
principles continued to have effect on the SA’s conception of itself until the end of the Third 
Reich.96 They serve as a paradigmatic example that the initiatives and activities of the late SA 
continued to revolve around the poles of discipline and integration and as such contributed to the 
formation of the Volksgemeinschaft structured along racial lines. Consequently, Siegfried Kasche 
ranked the bringing into line and the ‘steering’ [Führung] of his fellow Germans among the most 
important aspects of the SA’s settlement commitment.97 The concrete plans for the resettlement 
of SA men into conquered Eastern Europe, developed since 1938, thus have to be seen as one 
element of a larger process of transforming the Erwartungsraum, or ‘space of expectations’ of a 
racially and politically homogeneous ‘people’s community’ into an Erfahrungsraum, or ‘space 
of experience’ in the near future.98 That the SA hardly possessed any kind of practical experience 
in ethnical settlement questions [Volkstumsarbeit], as Kasche himself freely acknowledged in 
1941,99 somehow paradoxically contributed to the fact that it was able to keep up its expectations 
for the future, despite being ousted by Himmler’s SS. 
With regard to the history of the stormtroopers, one can draw a line from the 1920s to the 
1940s. Already in the early years after the First World War, the idea that the nascent SA in line 
with other Wehrverbände was called to defend the legitimate interest of the German people 
living in the borderland regions of the German Reich was prominent. Ten years later, this idea 
radicalised with the German settlement movement in the 1930s that attempted to intensify the 
German ‘inner colonization’ along racial and political lines. By the late 1930s, the emphasis had 
shifted from inner to outer colonization, the conquest of new German territories in the European 
East. The Volksgemeinschaft was meanwhile understood as a Wehrgemeinschaft, with actual 
settlement initiatives postponed for peacetime.100 Yet the concepts of racial superiority and the 
SA’s alleged settlement mission continued to inspire its ‘defence activities’ against increasing 
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‘partisan attacks’ until the last phase of the Second World War. In the General Government, SA 
units were from 1944 onward regularly used for police tasks; ‘completely armed’ by the Nazi 
regime.101 Similar to the development in the General Government, the SA-Gruppe Südmark in 
Slovenia since 1942 played a vital role in the ‘securing’ of Southern Styr and Carniola, an effort 
that included the persecution of both alleged and real partisans. In the annexed or occupied parts 
of the Greater German Reich, regional policing there went hand in hand with attempts to 
‘Germanise’ those parts of the local populations deemed racially sufficient.102 Whereas the actual 
settlement of stormtroopers in Eastern Europe failed with few exceptions, its concepts of race, 
discipline and the ability to self-defence on the occasion of its settlement initiatives contributed 
to the radicalisation of the people’s community in the occupied territories. 
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